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Reflective Cardinals
Alternate Title: Higher Order Set Theory with Reflective Cardinals
Abstract: We introduce and axiomatize the notion of a reflective cardinal, use it to
give semantics to higher order set theory, and explore connections between the
notion of reflective cardinals and large cardinal axioms.
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1 Introduction
Despite vast advances in set theory and mathematics in general, the language of
set theory, which is the de facto formal language of mathematics, has remained the
same since the beginning of modern set theory and first order logic. That formal
language has served us well, but it has a major limitation: It does not adequately
deal with properties for which there is no set of all objects satisfying the property.
In particular, it does not allow quantification over such predicates, nor creation of
collections of such predicates. Our purpose is to address this deficiency, and to
extend the expressive power of set theory to the furthest heights.
A natural way to extend a language is to augment it with higher types, and it is not
technically difficult to come up with a higher order set theory. Examples include
Kelley-Morse set theory and Ackermann set theory. The problem is rather a
ω
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semantic one. If a set is an arbitrary collection of objects, what sense do we make
of "collections" that are not sets?
We avoid this problem by not including "collections" that are not sets. Our addition
to the language of set theory is instead a predicate on sets:  iff  is a reflective
cardinal. We provide semantics for  both by "defining"  in the human language,
and by creating formal axiomatic systems that include . We then interpret higher
order set theory in terms of ordinary set theory augmented with .
In the second section, we define , and interpret higher order set theory using .
In the third section, we axiomatize  and explain the axioms. In the fourth section,
we demonstrate a close connection between  and large cardinal axioms. In the
fifth section, we iterate the notion of a reflective cardinal, axiomatize the resulting
extensions, and again demonstrate a connection with large cardinal axioms. In the
sixth section, we use reflective cardinals to argue for existence of supercompact
cardinals. In the seventh and eighth sections, we introduce notions of reflective
sequences of ordinals — notions that go beyond the expressive power of reflective
cardinals.
By its nature, the paper includes both formal results and philosophical arguments.
The formal results are valid theorems independently of whether the reader agrees
with us that the notion of a reflective cardinal is a well-defined one.
For background about large cardinals, the reader is referred to a standard text on
set theory such as (Jech 2006), or to a text on large cardinals, such as (Kanamori
2008). For background about subtle and ineffable cardinals, see (Friedman 2001).
Reflective cardinals (under the name of reflective ordinals) were originally
introduced in (Taranovsky 2005). The exposition of reflective cardinals there can be
seen as a precursor to this paper.
2 Definition and Philosophy
Definition:  is a reflective cardinal, denoted by , iff  has the same
theory with parameters in  as  for every cardinal  with sufficiently
strong reflection properties.
Semantics of higher order set theory: A statement in higher order set theory
(such as a second order statement about ) is true iff it is true about  for a
reflective . If  is a formula in higher order set theory and 
are sets, then  is true iff it is true about  for a reflective  with
.
The definition is not formalizable in the language of set theory: A proper extension
to the language of set theory cannot be made in the language of set theory. Instead,
just like the notion of set itself, the definition is made in the human language. We
then use general reasoning to come up with axioms about the notion, and the
axioms are in turn used to prove formal theorems. In turn, the theorems can
provide insights that may lead to new axioms.
Informally, a reflection property states that the ordinal is in a certain way similar to
Ord (the class of all ordinals). An example is:  is a  elementary substructure of
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. For any particular finite , this is formalizable in the language of set theory, and
existence of such  provable in ZFC.
Large cardinal properties are canonical examples of reflection properties. Large
cardinal axioms are often motivated by a consideration about what properties
should Ord satisfy (such as being regular), and they postulate existence of cardinals
with some of these properties. Reflective cardinals satisfy all genuine large cardinal
properties that are expressible in the ordinary language of set theory and are fully
realized in .
The definition of reflective cardinals relies on some notion of a sufficiently strong
reflection property. Evidence for existence of such properties comes from inner
model theory. Let  be a canonical inner model (such as ), and let  be the
sharp of .  generates a proper class of indiscernibles for . Inside , these
indiscernibles satisfy sufficiently strong reflection properties, so if  exists, the
notion of reflective cardinals for  is not problematic (and  is definable in ).
For , however, the analogue of  is not definable in the language of set theory.
Instead, we are postulating existence of sufficiently strong reflection properties for
the definition of reflective cardinals to make sense.
By the reflection principle, in so far as a statement  in higher order set theory is
meaningful and true, it must be true about  for some cardinal . If it were
otherwise, then the set-theoretical universe would appear incomplete since there is
new structure at the level of Ord that is not there earlier in a similar form. Since in
a sufficient sense, reflective cardinals are those that are most like Ord,  must also
be true about reflective cardinals. Now, we turn this around and use reflective
cardinals to define semantics of higher order theory: If  is a formula in
higher order set theory and  are sets, then  is true iff it is
true about  for a reflective  with . This definition is correct in
so far as higher order set theory is meaningful, and since the definition gives
unambiguous truth value semantics, there is no sense in considering higher order
set theory to be meaningless. For a reflective , sets correspond to sets in , and
proper classes and beyond correspond to sets outside of .
To encapsulate higher order set theory with arbitrary set parameters, the definition
of reflective cardinals includes two things:
* We use a predicate for reflective cardinals instead of a constant for the least
reflective cardinal.
* We require "correctness" with arbitrary parameters in  instead of just
correctness of the theory .
Just using a constant for the least reflective cardinal would not even be sufficient to
define the satisfaction relation for ordinary set theory.
For more discussion, see (Taranovsky 2005) and also "Reflective Sequences"
(especially "Introduction") below.
3 Axioms for Reflective Cardinals
We propose the following statements as axioms for reflective cardinals (see below
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for explanation and justification):
A0. ZFC
A1.
A2.  [ that is  is an ordinal ]
A3.
, where  ranges over
(codes for) formulas in set theory (without ) with all parameters shown. 
A4. There is a proper class of reflective cardinals.
A5. Axiom schema of replacement for -formulas.
A6. Axiom schema for every formula  in the extended language (that includes ):
 (  not free in )
A7. Reflective cardinals are regular.
A8. Reflective cardinals are fully indescribable:
, where
 ranges over (codes for) formulas in set theory (without ) with all parameters
shown.
Notes:
* A6 ⇒ (A4 and A5); A8 ⇒ A7. All theorems will explicitly state which axioms
(beyond ZFC) are used, and A4, A5, and A7 are included so that we can state
theorems with less assumptions. A7 and A8 will be justified in the next section,
where it will be shown that they do not increase the consistency strength of the
theory.
* Fully indescribable cardinals are totally indescribable. Full indescribability of κ
can also be stated as a schema (implied by A8 for κ∈R): (  has two free variables
and does not use ) . A fully
indescribable cardinal need not be a  elementary substructure of V: The least
fully indescribable cardinal is below the least subtle cardinal (for each , ZFC +
subtle cardinal proves that the least -indescribable cardinal is below the least
subtle cardinal). However, if a fully indescribable cardinal is a  elementary
substructure of V, then it is strongly unfoldable.
A1 is obvious, and A2 is clear from the definition.
To explain A3, we start with the basic relations of reflective cardinals. Clearly,
(1)  and  for every  in the language of set theory with
parameters in .
For the other direction, we want to formalize something like this:
(2) (  and  and for all appropriate .
We create A3 by combining (1) and (2) and using a reflective cardinal above  to
formalize the quantification over formulas in (2). In A3,  is the Gödel number of .
An alternative formulation of A3 is to use elementary substructures where 
codes the theory of  with constant  and parameters in :
.
A4 is the weakest existence axiom required for reflective cardinals to fulfill their
role of giving semantics for higher order set theory (with arbitrary set-sized
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parameters). A4 (or a weakening stating that there is no largest reflective cardinal)
is also necessary for A3 to imply (1) and (2).
ZFC together with A1-A4 forms a minimal theory of reflective cardinals, and this
theory turns out to be finitely axiomatizable. However, the theory is missing
replacement for -formulas, and it does not even prove that some ordinal is a limit
of reflective cardinals. In ZFC minus replacement, replacement is equivalent to this
reflection schema: There is  that is  correct with parameters in . A6 is the
analogous schema for -formulas, except that we also require  to be reflective. A6
is true since it is satisfied by every cardinal  with sufficiently strong reflection
properties. We also include A5 in case the reader is not convinced about A6.
Arguments for large cardinal axioms often involve imagining  as a completed
totality, and then trying to go beyond and contemplating the largeness of the class
of all ordinals. Since reflective cardinals provide semantics for higher order set
theory, these arguments can be recast with greater precision as arguments about
reflective cardinals. For example, using the semantics of higher order set theory, A7
is simply the statement that the axiom schema of replacement holds for arbitrary
proper classes (in place of formulas). There is a general agreement that Ord should
be regular (in so far as "Ord is regular" is meaningful), and inaccessible cardinals
are already accepted by mainstream mathematicians in the form of Grothendieck
universes.
4 Theory of Reflective Cardinals
The notion of reflective cardinals has a close connection with large cardinal axioms.
Theorem 1 (ZFC + A1-A4): Let  be a reflective cardinal. Then,
(a)  satisfies ZFC, and (as a theorem schema)  is an elementary
substructure of .
(b) In HOD,  is fully indescribable.
Proof: (a) To see that  satisfies ZFC (as a single statement), note that by A3, if
 are reflective, then  is an elementary substructure of . To see that
 is  correct, if a  statement  (possibly with parameter in ) is true,
then there is some  witnessing its truthfulness and (by A4) two reflective cardinals
above , and so by A3,  is true in . By induction on , one sees (as a
theorem schema) that  is  correct for all .
(b) Assume contrary, and let φ be a formula contradicting indescribability. Fix a
definable well-ordering of HOD. For an ordinal  that is not φ-indescribable in
HOD, let  be the least witness to the describability of ; and let  be 
otherwise. If  are reflective, then by definability of , . Thus,
reflective cardinals are φ-indescribable with respect to , and hence fully
indescribable in HOD.
As the proof shows, reflective cardinals must satisfy large cardinal properties (such
as indescribability) with respect to definable sets, and in HOD, that implies the
corresponding large cardinal axioms. In general, however, the lifting from definable
to arbitrary sets does not work, and ZFC + A0-A4 + no inaccessible cardinals
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appears to be consistent. I conjecture that the consistency strength of singular
reflective cardinals is the same as the consistency strength of measurable reflective
cardinals.
Question: What is the consistency strength of ZFC + A1-A5 + reflective cardinals
are singular?
If we do not have a proper class of reflective cardinals, than besides A1-A3,A5, the
axiomatization would also need to include a schema like A3 but using Ord and V in
place of  and , and also a schema that for reflective ,  is an elementary
substructure of . With this, a single reflective cardinal is (by compactness of first
order logic) is equiconsistent with ZFC. Two reflective cardinals imply that
reflective cardinals are (as a schema) fully indescribable in HOD.
Theorem 2: ZFC + A1-A4 is finitely axiomatizable.
Proof: For the axiomatization, we use A1-A4 plus (a finite axiomatization of) ZFC
with separation and replacement limited to  formulas. The inductive proof of
Theorem 1(a) goes through in this theory, and thus every axiom of ZFC is provable.
Theorem 3: If  is a subtle cardinal, then for some regular  with  an
elementary substructure of , there is  such that  satisfies A1-A8.
Proof: Fix a well-ordering  of  with sets of lower rank coming before sets of
higher rank, and add a symbol for  to the language. Let C = { :  is an
elementary substructure of , allowing  in formulas}. Let  code the
theory of  with parameters in , where  is an uncountable cardinal
below .  is closed and unbounded, so by Lemma 1.6 of "Subtle Cardinals and
Linear Orderings", there is regular  in  with a stationary subset  of 
homogeneous for . Let  be the following superset of :  = { : there is
 in  such that theory of  with parameters in  agrees with the
corresponding theory for }.  satisfies all the axioms. A6 holds because R
is stationary, and A8 holds because every element of  is ordinal definable from 
.
To get an exact equiconsistency, we introduce the following weakening of A3:
A3a. (Schema)  (  has two free
variables and does not use ).
"Ord is subtle" is the schema 
where  and  are definable (from parameters) classes and C is a club sublass of
Ord and . It may also refer to the weaker schema ,
which implies that for every set of ordinals ,  satisfies the stronger
schema (and hence both forms of ZFC + "Ord is subtle" prove the same 
statements). We believe "Ord is subtle" should refer to the stronger schema; it is
not even clear whether the weaker schema proves existence of  that satisfies
ZFC.
Theorem 4: The following are equiconsistent and prove the same  statements:
(1) ZFC + A1 + A2 + A3a + 2 reflective cardinals + (schema)
c Vc κ Vκ
V
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κ λ Vλ
Vκ R ⊂ λ (Vλ, ∈,R)
W Vκ
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Vκ W f(α) ⊂ α
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κ C
λ C E λ ∩ C
f R E R α < λ
β > α E (Vκ, ∈,α) Vα
β (Vλ, ∈,R)
Vλ W
∀a ∈ R∀b ∈ R∀s ∈ Vmin(a,b)(φ(a, s) ⇔ φ(b, s)) φ
R
∃α, b (a ∈ C,β ∈ C, a < b) f(Vα) = f(Vβ) ∩ Vα
C f
∀Xf(X) ⊂ X f(α) = f(β) ∩ α
X HOD[X]
ΠV2
Vκ
ΠV2
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(2) ZFC + A1 + A2 + A3a + A4-A7 + (schema) reflective cardinals are fully
indescribable
(3) ZFC + (schema) Ord is subtle (either of the two forms)
(4) ZFC + (schema in )  is fully indescribable + (schema) 
Proof: Let (3) use the stronger form of Ord is subtle. We have (2)⇒((1) and (3) and
(4)). (4)⇒(3). For each , (3) proves existence of two cardinals satisfying (1)
restricted to  formulas, and thus (3)⇒(1) for statements in  (that is
statements in  provable in (1) are provable in (3)). Let  code a
well-ordering of  where  is the least ordinal with . (1) implies that
 satisfies (4) (with reflective cardinals being fully indescribable), and
hence (1)⇒(4) for  statements (see also proof of Theorem 5). Finally, given (4),
for a natural number , if we define  below  based on A3a restricted to 
formulas, then  is stationary below  and  satisfies (2) restricted to 
statements. Thus (4) ⇒ (2) for statements in , which completes the proof.
Notes:
* (2) and (4) prove the same  statements where for (2)  denotes a
reflective cardinal. Similarly, (1) and ZFC + A1 + A2 + A3a + A4-A6 prove the same
 statements.
* (1) and (3) (stronger form) prove the same (V, ∈) statements. (Given  and , any
pair of reflective cardinals above the parameters used to define  and  witnesses
"Ord is subtle" for  and , so (1)⇒(3).)
* (2) can be strengthened with the schema: there is -correct reflective cardinal
κ such that (  has two free variables and does not use )
 without introducing new
 theorems.
* If the requirement of being an elementary substructure of V is dropped from (1)
and (4), then the two theories remain equiconsistent with each other, and we
conjecture remain equiconsistent with the other theories.
Theorem 5: In each of ZFC+A1-A4 and ZFC+A1-A5 and ZFC+A1-A6, axiom A8
(reflective cardinals are fully indescribable) is  (for formulas without )
conservative over the base theory.
Proof: Let  be a  statement that is unprovable in the base theory, and let  be
a model in which  fails. Let  — as computed in  — be a set of ordinals coding
a well-ordering of some  that witnesses the failure of . Then
 satisfies A8 and the failure of T. Here  is defined in  as the
natural conversion of  to HOD[X]:  there is ,  such that
 and as computed in , the
theory of  with parameters in  agrees with that of .
 is a very broad class of statements (it even includes GCH), so Theorem 5
suggests that A8 is "safe". The known arguments for large cardinal axioms (see for
example [Kanamori 2008]) combined with Theorems 1-5 create a powerful
argument for acceptance of totally indescribable (and even strongly unfoldable)
cardinals as axioms. Being totally indescribable corresponds to our intuition about
(V , ∈,κ) κ Vκ ≺ V
n
Σn (V , ∈)
(V , ∈) X
Vα α Vα ≺Σ2 V
HOD[X]
ΠV2
n R κ Σn
R κ Vκ Σ
R
n
(V , ∈)
(V , ∈,κ) κ
(V , ∈,κ)
f C
f C
f C
ΣV ,Rn
φ R
∀A ⊂ κ (φ(κ,A) ⇒ ∃λ < κ (R(λ) ∧ φ(λ,A ∩ λ)))
(V , ∈,κ)
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T X M
Vκ T
(HOD[X]M , ∈,R′) R′ M
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the theory of finite types above , and without V=HOD, axioms A1-A6 do not be
appear to imply any boldface indescribability.
Once a large cardinal notion is accepted, the use of reflective cardinals can often
be used to argue for a stronger notion, as illustrated by the next theorem.
Theorem 6 (ZFC+A1-A4): (a) If  is elementary with critical point  and
 and , then  where .
(b) If V=HOD, and a reflective cardinal is -strong, then reflective cardinals are
Shelah (and hence Woodin).
Proof: (a) Assume contrary. Because  exists, ordinals below  can be
coded (in a definable way absolute between V and M) by ordinals below . In
turn, an ordinal below ordinal below  can be represented by an ordinal
definable well-ordering of  of the right order type (note that since  is the critical
point, ). Let  be such a representation of .
We have  (the last equality holds
because both  and  are reflective in ), which contradicts .
(b) Let , ,  be reflective, , and  a - -strong elementary
embedding with crit( ) = . Let  be the least (under the canonical
well-ordering of V (V=HOD)) witness (if any) that  is not Shelah. Since  is -
-strong,  and . Furthermore, , so
 as required.
Note: Because ZFC+A1-A4 lacks full separation, it does not prove that a 
-complete ultrafilter generates an embedding that is elementary for arbitrary 
-formulas (where  is used in  in place of ). However, the theorem stays true
if we only require  to be elementary for formulas without .
5 Iterations of Reflectiveness
5.1 Axiomatization and Properties
The same process that led us to reflective cardinals can be repeated any number of
times. For example, we can call a cardinal  is -reflective iff  has the
same theory with parameters in  as  for every cardinal  with
sufficiently strong reflection properties (  is the predicate for reflective cardinals).
Here is a basic axiomatization of arbitrary ordinal levels of reflectiveness:
B1. ZFC
B2. for all  there is 
B3.
B4.  iff  is a regular uncountable cardinal
B5.
B6. for limit , .
V
j : V →M κ
R(κ) j(R)(κ) o(κ) > (κ+plus)
L κplus = (κ
+)HOD
R
0# (κ+plus)
L
κplus
κplus
κ κ
HODM ∩ P(κ) = HOD ∩ P(κ) A(κ) o(κ)
A(κ) = j(A(κ)) ∩ κ = AM(j(κ)) ∩ κ = AM(κ)
κ j(κ) M o(κ)M < o(κ)
κ λ μ κ < λ < μ j : V →M μ R
j κ fa : a→ a
a j μ R
fMκ = fκ f
M
λ
= fλ j(fκ) ∩ Vλ = fλ
j(fκ)(κ) = fλ(κ) < μ
κ
R
j(R) M R
j R
κ 2 (V ,κ, ∈,R)
Vκ (V ,λ, ∈,R) λ > κ
R
x {(y, z) ∈ x : R(y, z)}
R(y, z) ⇒ Ord(y) ∧ Ord(z)
R(0,x) x
R(n+ 1, a) ⇒ R(n, a)
n R(n, a) ⇔ ∀m < nR(m, a)
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B7.
where  ranges over (codes for) formulas in set theory with  with all parameters
shown.
B8. Schema (  is a natural number): There is a  correct -reflective cardinal
.
Notes:
*  means that  is level -reflective. If  is , then  is the
predicate for reflectiveness used in the previous section.
* B7 is the analogue of A3.
* B8 is true because it is satisfied by every ordinal with sufficiently strong reflection
properties.
* For a predicate ,  is defined to be  correct iff for all  (with one free
variable) for all ,  satisfies  iff  holds in .  formulas
are formulas of the form  (  alternating quantifiers) where  is a
bounded quantifier formula (but allowing ).
* A weakening of B8 that would allow finite axiomatizability is:
.
Axioms B1-B8 seem too incomplete. For example, they do not appear to answer
whether reflective cardinals are Mahlo, or whether there are stationary many
reflective cardinals. To resolve the incompleteness, we add the following
strengthening of B8:
B9. Schema (  is a natural number): There is a -correct -reflective
measurable cardinal , and a corresponding embedding  (with crit( )= ) such that
 holds.
Because of its correctness,  in B9 can represent the class of ordinals Ord, and
 captures the idea that reflective cardinals are those that are most like
Ord.
B1-B8 plus any one of B9 or B9a (see below) or V=HOD[X] implies that 
-reflective cardinals are fully indescribable, even for formulas in .
We start our investigation with finite levels of reflectiveness. For finite , there is a
natural weakening of reflectiveness:  is weakly -reflective cardinal iff the theory
of  with parameters in  is correct (as defined using 
-reflective cardinals) where  are  reflective cardinals
above . An axiomatization of weakly -reflective cardinals uses A0-A2, A4, and a
natural modification of B7:
B7a:  holds iff for all  with  and , the
theory of  with parameters in  agrees with the theory of
.
-weakly reflective cardinals are n-reflective, and -reflective cardinals are
weakly -reflective. While for , the notion of -reflective is more expressive
∀n, a, b, c(Ord(n) ∧ Ord(a) ∧R(n+ 1, b) ∧R(n+ 1, c) ∧ 0 < a < b < c⇒
(R(n+ 1, a) ⇔ ∀φ^∀s ∈ Va(((Vb, ∈,Rn) ⊨ φ(a, s)) ⇔ ((Vc, ∈,Rn) ⊨ φ(b, s)))))
φ^ Rn
m ΣV ,Rm κ
κ
R(y, z) z y Ry(z) R(y, z) R1
P κ ΣV ,Pn Σ
V ,P
n φ
s ∈ Vκ (Vκ, ∈,P) φ(s) φ(s) V Σ
V ,P
n
∃x1∀x2. . .xnψ n ψ
P
∀x ∈ Ord ∃y > xR(y, y)
n ΣV ,Rn κ
κ j j κ
j(R)(κ,κ)
κ
j(R)(κ,κ)
n+ 1
(V , ∈,Rn)
n
κ n
(V , ∈,κ, a1. . . an−1) Vκ n
a1 < a2 <. . . . an−1 n− 1
κ n
R(a) a1. . . an+1 R(ai) a ≤ a1 < a2 <. . . an+1
(Van+1 , ∈, a, a2. . an) Va
(Van+1 , ∈, a1, a2. . an)
n+ 1 n
n n > 1 n
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than that of weakly -reflective, the difference is slight, much less than the
difference between -reflective and -reflective. To see that, if we extend
expressiveness slightly by adding satisfaction relation for , then the extended
weakly -reflective cardinals become more expressive than the (unextended) 
-reflective cardinals. By induction on , one sees that an -tuple of extended
weakly n-reflecting cardinals ( ) can be used to define the predicate for 
-reflective cardinals below it, and with the least element of the -tuple
corresponding to an elementary substructure of . I am not sure whether
weakly -reflective cardinals should simply be called -reflective, but this paper
currently uses -reflective for the stronger notion.
The hierarchy of -reflective cardinals is intertwined with the hierarchy of
subtle/ineffable cardinals.
Theorem 7 (A0-A2, A4, B7a(n+1)): weakly -reflective cardinals are 
-ineffable in HOD.
Proof: Fix a definable well-ordering  of HOD. We first show that the reflective
cardinals are -subtle. Let  and  witness least failure of -subtlety of .
Fix  that are -weakly-reflective. By reflectiveness (and
definability and closure and unboundness of ),  belong to . By
weak -reflectiveness of , ,
which shows that  is -subtle.
To get ineffability, we need stationary many cardinals that are sufficiently reflective
cardinals, so we introduce the following weakening:  iff the theory of
 with parameters in  is correct (that is agrees with the
theory for weakly -reflective ). The proof is completed by checking that  is
stationary below weakly -reflective cardinals and that the  cardinals suffice for
the agreement of subsets for ineffability.
Theorem 8: If  is an n-subtle cardinal, then for some regular  with  an
elementary substructure of , there is  such that  satisfies A0-A2,
A6, B7a. Alternatively,  can be chosen to satisfy B1-B8, restricted to -reflective
cardinals or less. Moreover, the -reflective (and weakly -reflective) cardinals can
be chosen to be -ineffable (if ) and fully indescribable in .
Proof: Analogous to the proof for consistency of reflective cardinals from a subtle
cardinal. For -reflective cardinals, use their reduction to a slightly stronger
variant of weakly -reflective cardinals. To get ineffability, use a well-ordering 
and the proof of Theorem 7 (and analogously with the indescribability).
A substantial fragment of the theory of -reflective cardinals is conservative over
ZFC:
Theorem 9: The following theory is conservative over ZFC:
- The language consists of first order logic, , and  predicates .
- ZFC, plus replacement for formulas in the extended language
- (schema, ) there is cardinal κ satisfying 
- (schema, ) 
- (schema, , and ' ' uses a schema)
.
n
n n+ 1
(V , ∈)
n n
m m
m ≤ n m
m
(V , ∈,Rm)
n n
n
n
n+ 1 n
W
n C(α) f(α) n α
a1 < a2 <. . .< an+2 n+ 1
C a1. . an+1 C(an+1)
n+ 1 ai f(an+2)(a1. . an) = a1 ∩ f(an+2)(a2. . . an+1)
an+2 n
R′(a)
(Van+ω, ∈, a, a2. . an) Va
n a R′
n R′
κ λ Vλ
Vκ R ⊂ λ (Vλ, ∈,R)
R n
n n
n− 1 n > 1 Vλ
n
n W
n
∈ ω R1,R2, . . .
n > 0 Rn(κ)
n > 0 ∀κ ∈ Rn+1 κ ∈ Rn
n > 0 ≺
∀κ ∈ Rn (Vκ, ∈,R1, . . . ,Rn−1) ≺ (V , ∈,R1, . . . ,Rn−1)
10
- (schema, ,  is a formula in  with two free variables, and
 ranges over sets definable in )
.
Proof: Given a model of ZFC and a finite fragment of the theory, we interpret the
fragment as follows, and the conservation result follows. Let  be sufficiently
large relative to the fragment,  the largest integer such that  is used in
the fragment, and  an ordinal such that . Let T be the 
theory  with parameters in  where  is the least ordinal such that
 and set  to hold iff  theory of  with
parameters in  is T. Define  analogously, always using  in
place of , and verify that the fragment of the theory holds.
Lightface Reflective Cardinals
We briefly discuss what happens to the consequences provable from the axioms if in
the definition of reflective cardinals, we simply used 'theory' instead of 'theory with
parameters'.
* As the theorem above shows, a version of the theory (using  in place of ) of
lightface -reflective cardinals is conservative over ZFC. However, to make the
theory appear more definite, we would want to replace that schema with the
appropriate analogue of B7 that does not use  as the second argument of . The
consistency strength remains below inaccessible. If  is inaccessible in ,
then we can pick  such that  and set  based on agreement
of  theory of  with . The extension to transfinite levels of
lightface reflectiveness is straightforward. If we require lightface reflective
cardinals to be regular, then it suffices for  to be Mahlo in  (so the
consistency strength remains below Mahlo).
* For , there is a strengthening of lightface -reflectiveness that can be
axiomatized as follows: (schema;  has two free variables and does not use )
, where  is the predicate for 
-element subsets of , or a single statement that encompasses the schema
(assuming ) by using  in place of  for a lightface
reflective . A model of this (  arbitrary but fixed; the model
satisfies ZFC + a proper class of such cardinals + , etc.)
can be obtained using a weakly compact cardinal. Conversely, under V=HOD, given
the schema (even without ) and a lightface 3-reflective
limit  of  lightface 3-reflective cardinals, lightface reflective cardinals are weakly
compact (because they would form a counterexample to the least failure of the
partition relation). Furthermore, under V=HOD and the schema, if the set of
lightface -reflective cardinals is stationary below (a regular lightface 
-reflective) , then they are -ineffable. The arguments below about -Erdös
cardinals (and ) also apply to lightface -reflective cardinals, assuming that they
are required to be indiscernibles for predicates definable in  without
parameters.
5.2 -Reflective Cardinals and Beyond
n ∈ N φ (V , ∈,R1, . . . ,Rn)
S (V , ∈,R1, . . . ,Rn)
∀κ ∈ Rn+1∀λ ∈ Rn+1∀s ∈ S (φ(κ, s) ⇔ φ(λ, s))
n ∈ N
m ∈ N Rm
κ (Vκ, ∈) ≺Σn(m+1) (V , ∈) Σn
(V , ∈,κ) Vγ γ
(Vγ, ∈) ≺Σn (V , ∈) R1(α) Σn (V , ∈,α)
Vγ Ri+1 V , ∈,R1, . . . ,Ri
V , ∈
N S
n
s φ
ρ Lω+2(Vρ)
κ < ρ Vκ ≺Σ
ω2+ω
Vρ Rn(α)
Σωn (Vρ, ∈,α) (Vρ, ∈,κ)
ρ Lω+2(Vρ)
n > 1 n
φ R
∀κ ∈ Rnn∀λ ∈ R
n
n∀m ∈ N (φ(κ,m) ⇔ φ(λ,m)) R
n
n n
Rn
∀κ ∈ Rn (Vκ, ∈) ≺ (V , ∈) Vμ V
μ > max(κ ∪ λ) n < ω
∀κ ∈ Rn (Vκ, ∈) ≺ (V , ∈)
∀κ ∈ Rn (Vκ, ∈) ≺ (V , ∈)
κ κ
n+ 2 n+ 2
κ n α
0# ω
(V , ∈)
ω
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Existence of a proper class (or just ) of -reflective cardinals is inconsistent with
.
Theorem 10 (B1-B7 + a proper class of -reflective cardinals + the full axiom of
replacement): Every set has a sharp. For every countable-in-HOD ordinal , there is
-Erdös cardinal in HOD. If V=HOD and there is a reflective limit of -reflective
cardinals, then reflective cardinals are Ramsey.
Proof: For a set of ordinals , -reflective cardinals above  (that is above
) form indiscernibles for , so  has a sharp.
If there is no  Erdős cardinal in HOD, let  be the least witness of the failure
of the partition relation. Then one easily shows that for a -reflective , -reflective
cardinals below  are indiscernibles for , and thus the partition relation holds
in . Since  is countable in HOD, it also holds in HOD and hence there is an 
-Erdős cardinal in HOD.
If  is not Ramsey in HOD, let  be the well-ordering-least partition relation
contradicting Ramseyness. The -reflective cardinals below  then form the
desired homogeneous set.
For the proof of existence -Erdös cardinal in HOD (for  countable-in-HOD), it is
enough to have -reflective cardinals.
We do not know if "B1-B7 + a proper class of -reflective cardinals + reflective
limit of ω-reflective cardinals" proves that reflective cardinals are Ramsey in HOD.
Theorem 11: If κ is ≥ -Erdös cardinal (  a limit ordinal), then there is  such that
 satisfies B1-B7 + there are -reflective cardinals.
Proof: Choose a well-ordering  of  with sets of lower rank coming before sets
of higher rank. Let  code theory of  with finite sets of ordinals as
parameters. Get a homogeneous set  for  of order type , and let  be the
Skolem Hull of that set. Every order preserving one-to-one mapping  leads
to an embedding of  into , so let  be the set of critical points of such
embeddings. Then all members of  satisfy the requirements for ω-reflective
cardinals.
Corollary 12: If  is Ramsey, then there is  such that  satisfies ZFC+B1-B7 +
there is a proper class of -reflective cardinals.
Natural semantics for the axioms is provided by measurable cardinals:
Theorem 13: If  is measurable, then there is  such that  satisfies
B1-B8.
Moreover, if  is an elementary embedding with critical point , then
there is a unique (as a predicate on )  satisfying B1-B8 and .
Proof: By induction on degree of reflectiveness. Suppose that  is uniquely
defined and  holds. Then in , let  be -reflective. Using  and
, this uniquely defines  below ; moreover  has measure 1, so
 holds.
Following Mitchell, a normal measure  on  is called a weak repeat point iff for
ω1 ω
V = L
ω
α
α ω
X ω X
sup(X) + 1 L[X] X
α A(κ)
ω κ ω
α A(κ)
V α α
κ A(κ)
ω κ
α α
α+ ω ω
ω
α α R
Vκ α ω
W Vκ
f (Vκ, ∈,W)
E f α M
E → E
M M E ′
E ′
κ R Vκ
ω
κ R (Vκ, ∈,R)
j : V →M κ
Vκ R j(R)(κ,κ)
Rn
j(Rn)(κ) M κ n+ 1 V
M
j(κ)
j(Rn) Rn+1 κ Rn+1
j(Rn+1)(κ)
U κ
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every  there is a normal measure  on  in  such that .
Theorem 14: If  has a normal measure that is a weak repeat point, then there is
 such that  satisfies B1-B9.
Proof: Apply Theorem 13 to define  from the measure. The set
 has measure one, so in  there is
an ultrafilter on  that satisfies B9.
The notion of -reflective cardinals is more forward looking than simply the notion
of reflective cardinals, and given that for α≥ω it is necessarily stronger than ,
the use of measurable cardinals in B9 is not a dramatic strengthening. However,
there is a weakening of B9 that does not require existence of measurable cardinals.
B9a: Axiom schema consisting of (or equivalent to) all theorems provable in ZFC
about  where  satisfies B1-B8, and there is an elementary embedding
 with crit(j)=κ and .
Note: We can further weaken B9a by using ZFC\P (or other appropriate theory) in
place of ZFC.
B9a is equiconsistent with ZFC + measurable cardinal, but it has a somewhat
unsatisfying feel of using a measurable cardinal without claiming existence of a
measurable cardinal. That is why we chose the stronger B9.
5.3 HOD Sharp
Although I defined reflective cardinals in , they (or their analogues) can also be
defined for canonical inner models, including the constructive universe . If  is is
a canonical inner model (such as ), then the indiscernibles derived from  will
be -reflective in . For each finite level , the predicate for -reflectiveness can
be added to  in the unique way that satisfies the axioms and agrees with the
indiscernibles; and M satisfies replacement for formulas involving ). However,
for many  (including , but not ) the predicate for -reflective ordinals
would allow us to transcend . (For , -reflective ordinals transcend 
, but  is obtained from  by iterating away , and the missing large
cardinal structure is the reason -reflective ordinals for  do not lead to new
sets.)
It is plausible that ordinal definable real numbers are precisely those that are first
order definable using a finite level of reflectiveness. If this is so, then we define
 (  sharp) to be the real number coding
 where  are -reflective
.
 is the canonical real number that codes all ordinal definable real numbers.
 is not ordinal definable, and our apparent ability to define 
illustrates the power of our extension to the language of set theory.
To extend the notion of  to arbitrary sets, we propose the following
conjecture, the consistency of which is an open problem.
Conjecture: For every nonzero ordinal , every ordinal definable subset of  is
X ∈ U W κ Ult(V ,U) X ∈W
κ
R (Vκ, ∈,R)
R
{x < κ : R(x,x) ∧ (Vx, ∈,R|x) ≺ (Vκ, ∈,R)} M
κ
α
0#
(Vκ, ∈,R) R
j : V →M j(R)(κ)
V
L M
L M#
ω M n n
M
RMn
M M = L KDJ ω
M M = L[U] ω M
KDJ L[U] U
ω KDJ
HOD# HOD
{φ^ : n ∈ N ∧ (Vk ⊨ φ(k1, . . . , kn)) k1 < k2 <. . .< kn < k n
}
HOD#
HOD# HOD#
HOD#
κ κ
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definable (in ) from , an element of , and a finite set of -reflective
cardinals above .
The conjecture implies that for every infinite , . Assuming GCH
in HOD (which is likely to be true), the conjecture is equivalent to  = sup{
: a bijection between  and  is first-order-definable in  using a finite set of
-reflective cardinals above }.
A strengthened version of the conjecture is that for every nonempty set of ordinals
, every ordinal definable from  subset of sup( ) is definable (in ) from ,
an element of sup( ), and a finite set of -reflective cardinals above sup( ).
Another way to propose  is to claim a nontrivial elementary embedding
HOD→HOD, which is expressible in the higher order set theory. However, it is not
clear whether we can actually define such an embedding in the extended language
(and it is known not to be ordinal definable).
The notion of reflective cardinals (and the iterations of this notion) is the most
expressive extension to the language of set theory for which a reasonable
axiomatization is known. There is of course incompleteness in the axiomatization,
but it is comparable in scope to what we have in the rest of set theory.
6 Reflective Cardinals and Supercompactness
Reflective cardinals can be axiomatized at any large cardinal level beyond the
intrinsic strength of the basic axioms. By reflection, they satisfy all large cardinal
properties that are fully realized in . In this section, we use reflective cardinals to
argue for existence supercompact cardinals, and propose an axiomatization of
reflective cardinals using supercompact cardinals. I should note that the argument
is not conclusive. Supercompact cardinals probably exist, but we are not sure.
Note: Reinhardt's argument for extendible cardinals and Vopenka's argument for
Vopenka's cardinals can be viewed as precursors to this argument.
Let  be a reflective cardinal, and  be a reflective (or just  sound) cardinal
above . By largeness of  and by its reflecting properties, there must be a cardinal
 that is very similar to —as similar as it is possible to be and as is
expressible in the language of set theory. (Technically, "expressible in the language
of set theory" should be replaced here with something like "expressible with 
formulas".) We want to formalize that similarity as much possible.
By similarity of  and , and by the symmetry of , for some  (and with
), the structure of  is very similar to that of . Similarity
between structures is best expressed by using mappings between structures. Here,
that means an elementary embedding . By maximality of
,  should exist for some  if  can be sufficiently similar .
The embedding  must have a critical point, crit( ). The natural choice of crit( ) is 
, and by the reflecting properties of  this choice should be possible (for
appropriate ).
(V , ∈) κ κ ω
κ
κ cf((κ+)HOD) = ω
(κ+)HOD
λ κ λ (V , ∈)
ω κ
S S S (V , ∈) S
S ω S
HOD#
V
λ β ΣV2
λ λ
κ < λ λ
ΣV100
κ λ V α > κ
α < λ (Vα, ∈,κ) (Vβ, ∈,λ)
j : (Vα, ∈,κ) → (Vβ, ∈,λ)
V j α (Vα, ∈,κ) (Vβ, ∈,λ)
j j j κ
κ
α
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Moreover, having  with crit( )=  corresponds to the semantics of higher order set
theory, where sets stay the same while realizations of proper classes and higher
level structures depend on the choice of the reflective cardinal. If Ord (the class of
all ordinals) is represented by , then  is just a change of representation by which
Ord becomes represented by , and by which proper classes and beyond are moved
from being sets in  to being sets in .
Thus (in the absence of some unknown problem), we have non-trivial elementary
 with  and with  being  sound. This means that 
(and thus every reflecting cardinal) is supercompact.
Note: Because , there must be a limit to the degree of similarity between
them. We stay within the limit because we are only requiring only that (essentially)
there is a structure of the form  that is similar enough to , and not requiring
that the similarity (and  in particular) can be extended arbitrarily high up the
cumulative hierarchy.
Existence of a reflective supercompact cardinal is a much broader assertion than
that of existence of a supercompact cardinal. For example, existence of a
supercompact cardinal does not imply existence of a model of ZFC that satisfies all
true  statements. (Analogously, Con(ZFC + supercompact cardinal) does not
imply existence of a transitive model of ZFC.) Even having a reflective
supercompact cardinal is not the highest level of expressiveness to which
supercompactness can be added.
For a predicate , let us say that a cardinal  is -supercompact iff for every 
, there is  and elementary j  with . The
argument for existence of supercompact cardinals can be modified to show
existence of -supercompact cardinals.
To extend the strength of supercompactness to the full expressiveness of the
language, we strengthen A5 to read:
P1: Schema (  is a natural number): There is  correct -supercompact  such
that  holds.
P1 is probably true, but we do not have enough confidence to add it as axiom: We
are not yet able to rule out some kind of impossibility that would prohibit the
required elementary embeddings.
P1 actually goes slightly beyond supercompactness; for example, all 
-supercompact cardinals are extendible.
An important consequence of P1 is that for a proper class of reflective cardinals, for
every  with  belonging to that class and  reflective, there is  and
elementary  with  and .
Existence of an -supercompact reflective cardinal implies Vopenka's principle for
definable proper classes — more precisely, definable at a lower complexity level
than what is needed to define . However, existence of a Vopenka cardinal is a
philosophically stronger assumption — it assumes that elementary embeddings can
be found from just the largeness of the cardinal without relying on the symmetry of
j j κ
κ j
λ
Vα Vβ
j : Vα → Vβ λ = j(crit(j)) β Σ
V
2 λ
κ ≠ λ
Va Vβ
j
ΣV3
P κ P l > κ
a : (Va, ∈,P) → (Vl, ∈,P) κ = j(crit(j))
R
n ΣV ,Rn R κ
R(κ)
R
a < b < c a c d > c
j : Vb → Vd crit(j) = a j(a) = c
R
R
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the structure. The axiom of choice is notorious for breaking symmetry, so existence
of a Vopenka cardinal does not immediately follow from Vopenka's principle for
definable classes. However, I am not suggesting that Vopenka cardinals do not
exist. For example, if V=HOD, then reflective cardinals are Vopenka (assuming
existence of -supercompact reflective cardinals).
As I wrote in section "Iterations of Reflectiveness", reflectiveness can be iterated
any number of times. The analogue of B9 is:
P2: There is  correct -supercompact  such that  holds.
7 Beyond reflective cardinals
7.1 Overview
By the undefinability of truth, whenever we define a valid formal language, we can
go beyond it. However, at the outer limits of current mathematical expressiveness,
we have the notions but not a reasonable axiomatization. It is these notions that I
present here, hoping that they will be axiomatized in the future. (Update: A partial
axiomatization is in "Reflective Sequences" below.) The key idea is that instead of
using a single reflective cardinal, we use a sequence of them. Since we do not have
a good axiomatization, some of the discussion here is philosophical and may appear
vague to the reader, but the theorems are of course unambiguous.
To motivate the extensions, here is a definition that is expressible using iterated
reflectiveness:
Definition: A set  is a reflective -tuple iff there are -reflective  with
 and such that  with parameters in  agrees
with the theory in  where  is , and for every ordinal ,
 is a reflective tuple under the above definition.
Notes:
* Reflective -tuples correspond to weakly -reflective cardinals. Thus, as
discussed in a previous section, the predicate for reflective -tuples is slightly less
expressive (when combined with ordinary set theory) than the predicate for 
-reflective cardinals. However, even a single reflective n+1-tuple S can be used to
define the true predicate for -reflective cardinals for ordinals below min( ).
* The requirement for reflectiveness of  does not change the expressive power
of the predicate but allows us to have a nicer theory.
In general, given a type of objects, the reflection condition is formulated in the
following way:
 iff  satisfies sufficiently strong reflection properties so that the theory
 with parameters in  is independent of  (for objects of the
required type).
(Note: For technical convenience, we may also want to require that for every
ordinal , the theory  with parameters in  is correct for the type of
.)
R
ΣV ,Rn R κ R(κ,κ)
S n n b1, . . . , bn+1
b1 < b2 <. . . bn+1 (Vbn+1 , ∈,S) Vmin(S)
(Vbn+1 , ∈,T ) T {b1, . . . , bn} λ
S∖λ
n n
n
n
n S
S∖λ
R(O) O
(V , ∈,O) Vmin(O) O
λ (V , ∈,O∖Vλ) Vλ
O∖Vλ
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An axiomatization would consist of:
Description of the type of  for  satisfying  (for example  is an ordinal).1. 
The reflection condition above (analogous to A3).2. 
The analogue of A5 for  (such as replacement for -formulas).3. 
Large cardinal and reflection properties for  satisfying .4. 
Existence axioms for  satisfying .5. 
(1), (2), and (3) are routine. The problem is that we are not sure about (4) and (5).
7.2 Reflective -Sequences
The first notion, and the one that we understand best, is
Notion 1: A reflective sequence of ordinals of length .
This notion is more expressive than any ordinal iteration of reflectiveness: If  is a
reflective sequence of length , then the two variable  (in section "Iterations of
Reflectiveness") can be defined from  for ordinals below min( ) (and under our
definition below sup( )).
To axiomatize such sequences, for (4), one has to specify not merely the properties
with the individual members of , but also the properties of  as a whole. For
example, if there are I3 embeddings, then likely  is the critical sequence for some
elementary . On a more prosaic level,  should be Prikry generic for
some  where  is a measure in . In fact, it appears that a basic theory
requires little more than a measurable cardinal.
Definition: For a set , a set of ordinals  of order type  is lightface reflective for
 iff the theory  agrees with the theory  for every set of
ordinals  of order type  with sufficiently strong reflection properties.  (of order
type ) is reflective iff for every  with ,  is lightface
reflective for .
The definition does not immediately imply much about the structure theory for such
sequences. Thus, we start with a conjecture.
Conjecture: A set of ordinals of order type  with each member belonging to a
reflective -sequence is a reflective -sequence.
As the theorem below shows, any natural theory of reflective -sequences is
inconsistent with V=HOD. However, the concept of reflective -sequences may
have modifications that are applicable to some models of V=HOD.
Theorem 15: (a) There is a  formula  such that there is no ordinal definable
set  with .
(b) There is a  formula  such for every set of ordinals  of order type  with
, every ordinal definable set includes (as a
subset) or is disjoint from  except for a finite set.
Proof: (a) Let  be the following:  is ordinal definable and  is
odd, where  is the OD-least set such that  is finite.
O O R O
R R
O R
O R
ω
ω
S
ω R
S S
S
S S
S
j : Vλ → Vλ S
L[U] U L[U]
A S ω
A (V , ∈,S,A) (V , ∈,T ,A)
T ω S
ω A ∈ Vα α < sup(S) S∖α
A
ω
ω ω
ω
ω
ΣV2 φ
S ∃s ∈ S (φ(S) ⇔ φ(S∖{s}))
ΣV2 φ S ω
φ(S) ⇔ φ(S∖{S0}) ⇔ φ(S∖{S0,S1})
S
φ(S) S |T∖S ∪ S∖T |
T T∖S ∪ S∖T
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(b) Let  be the following:
(1) There is an ordinal definable set  such that both , and  are infinite,
and
(2) ⇔"  is even", where  is the HOD-least set that satisfies (1), and 
is the minimum index such that .
If (1) holds, then P is the same set for , , and , and by applying
(2) we can contradict . Thus (1) fails as
required.
The conjecture (together with the proof of the theorem) implies that for a reflective
sequence ,  does not satisfy the axiom of choice, and every set in
 contains (as a subset modulo a finite set) or is disjoint from 
modulo a finite set.
Certain weak variations on the notion of -sequences are well-understood (see the
theorem below), and they appear to satisfy the conjecture.
Let  be a predicate definable in  from a set  for some ordinal . A
cardinal  is -reflective iff the theory of  with parameters in  is the
same as the theory  where  and 
holds. Iteration of reflectiveness are defined analogously. Note that  can be coded
by a set, and the notion of -reflective (and - -reflective) is formalizable in our
language.
The following theorem states that definability using  iterations of reflectiveness
approximately corresponds to definability from a reflective -sequence  and 
levels of the constructible hierarchy above .
Theorem 16 (B1-B8): Let  be an ascending sequence of 
-reflective cardinals, and  definable in  where  is a set,  is an
ordinal, and . Let  be . Let  denote the power set
operation.
(a) The property of being an - -reflective cardinal is  definable in .
(b) Conversely, if  is an ascending sequence of - -reflective cardinals with
 and , then  theory of  with parameters in  agrees
with the corresponding  theory of .
(c) (b) with  definability replaced by  definability and elements of -
-reflective.
(d) (b) with  definability replaced by definability in
 (and
) where  and elements of 
are - -reflective.
(e) The property of being an - -reflective cardinal ( ) below  is
definable in .
φ(S)
P S ∩ P S∖P
P(S0) m P m ≥ 0
¬(P(Sm) ⇔ P(Sm+1))
S S∖{S0} S∖{S0,S1}
φ(S) ⇔ φ(S∖{S0}) ⇔ φ(S∖{S0,S1})
S HOD(Vsup(S))
HOD(Vsup(S)) S
ω
X (V , ∈,Rα) S α
κ X (V , ∈,X,κ) Vκ
(V , ∈,X,λ) λ > max(κ, rank(S)) R(α+ 1,λ)
X
X X β
ω2α
ω S α
{Vsup(S),S}
S = {Si : i < ω} S0
X (V , ∈, s,Ra) s a
S0 > max(a, rank(s)) λ sup(S) P
X ω Π
P ,X,S
1 Vλ
T X ω
T0 ≥ S0 sup(T ) ≤ λ Σ
P ,X,S
1 Vλ VS0
Σ
P ,X,T
1 Vsup(T )
Σ1 Σ<ω T X ω
2
Σ1
(Lα(Vλ,S,X ∩ Vλ), ∈,S,X ∩ Vλ)
(Lα(Vsup(T ),T ,X ∩ Vsup(T )), ∈,T ,X ∩ Vsup(T )) α < S0 T
X ω2α+ ω2
X ω2α α ≤ S0 λ
(Lα(Vλ,S,X ∩ Vλ), ∈,S,X ∩ Vλ)
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Proof: The proof is a routine induction on levels of reflectiveness, with (a) and (b)
being the key inductive step.
We could continue iterations of reflectiveness beyond Ord by relying on an ordinal
notation system. However, the proper course is to switch infinite sequences.
Let  be a model of ZFC + "every set has a sharp" that has a measurable cardinal
. Let  be a normal ultrafilter on ,  the corresponding -iterated ultrapower
embedding, , and . Note that  is Prikry generic
over . Let  — defined in  — be the set of  below  such that the theory of
 with parameters in  agrees with the theory of
.
Question: Does  — and the set of subsets of  of order type  — satisfy the basic
properties for the weakening of reflective -sequences to definability in the
constructible universe above the supremum of the sequence?
If yes, and if our construction is nonrestrictive (that is its axiomatization does not
prove false statements about the weakening of reflective -sequences), then we
could try to go further by using Prikry-Magidor forcing to get sequences longer
than .
7.3 Local Versions of Reflectiveness
The concept of reflectiveness can also be applied locally, below a regular
uncountable cardinal. By the vastness of , there should be enough space to have a
notion of reflective ordinals there. Conceivably, using reflective sequences, one
could have a local — that is in  for some small  — definition of the truth
predicate for set theory, but the more likely possibility is that such sequences are
definable not far beyond , and thus can be studied in the ordinary language of set
theory.
For countable ordinals, the key result is that assuming sufficient determinacy, all
sufficiently fast growing sequences of Turing degrees of length  are effectively
indistinguishable (Taranovsky 2012). A Turing degree  naturally maps to an
ordinal, specifically, the superior of -recursive well-orderings. Thus, it appears
that the predicate for lightface reflective for third order arithmetic sequences of
countable ordinals of length  that exclude their limit points is definable in third
order arithmetic from the satisfaction relation for third order arithmetic.
In some cases, there is a set of incompatible properties, and to define the analogue
of reflectiveness, we would have to choose one of the properties. For example,
below the least inaccessible cardinal, to define an analogue of reflective cardinals,
we would have to choose their cofinality. However, this diversity is not random. For
every regular uncountable cardinal, there is a well-ordered set (modulo
nonstationary sets) of canonical stationary sets. Once we pick a canonical ordinal
definable stationary set, the analogue of reflectiveness appears to become unique
— while some notions are stronger than others, all appear to be compatible. We
prove a strong result in that direction using a plausible determinacy assumption
(whose consistency, however, is not known).
M
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Definition: Extended Determinacy Maximum is the assertion that ordinal definable
(in the sense below) two player perfect information games of arbitrary ordinal
length with positions being sets definable from countable sets of ordinals are
determined.
Here, ordinal definable means that there is ordinal definable:
- initial position
- move function: position, player number, move → new position
- limit function  (applied at all limit stages):  → new position, where  is a
sequence of positions corresponding to a valid play (starting at the initial position)
such that for every valid  and  of the same length  holds if for
cofinally many  < length( ), .
- payoff set (set of positions won by the first player).
Theorem 17 (Extended Determinacy Maximum): Let  be a regular uncountable
cardinal such for every . Let  be a set of subsets of
 of order type , and  be a stationary subset of . There is a set
, and a function  such that (1) for every  with
,  where  is the least such that , and (2)
 is homogeneous for , that is  is independent of  for all  of order
type . Furthermore, the above holds if  is a function with
, with homogeneity defined by  where
.
Proof: Consider the following game: The players pick ordinals below , each of
which must be above all previous ordinals, and let  be the resulting sequence. Set
to  to be the set of limit points of  below sup( ) that are in . The game ends
when , and the first player wins iff . By stationarity of ,  will not be
reached before  will reach . Given a winning strategy , there is a strategy 
that depends only on  and the last ordinal. (Such  exists because the payoff
depends only this information, and the last ordinal played is increasing. We
construct such  from  by recursively mapping positions consistent with  into
plays consistent with , and doing this in a consistent way.)
By the closure of , there is a function  such that if all ordinals played so far are
, then the move by  is below .  is the desired function. The rest of the
theorem easily follows.
Note: Determinacy for games of length  suffices for S having only elements of
cofinality .
An interesting question is whether under appropriate assumptions, the theorem
extends to  and sequences of length . A consequence of the
theorem is that the analogues of reflectiveness cannot be used to define real
numbers that are not ordinal definable. True reflective sequences can also be
defined below a cardinal  that has sufficiently strong reflective properties. The
difference is that the relevant stationary set is not ordinal definable.
7.4 Further Extensions
Note: This is the original version. A new exposition with more details is in
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"Reflective Sequences" below.
Continuing our quest to higher levels of expressiveness beyond reflective 
-sequences:
Notion 2: For any ordinal , a reflective sequence  of length  with .
 excludes its limit points.
Notion 3: A reflective sequence  with the order type of  having sufficiently
strong reflection properties relative to .  excludes its limit points.
Notion 4: A reflective sequence  with length extremely large relative to min( ). 
excludes its limit points except for points of extremely high reflectiveness.  has a
maximum element, which, in terms of limit points, has maximal reflectiveness.
In Notion 4, a question arises about which limit points to include. We clarify the
type of  as follows: There is a transitive model  of ZFC such that  is the set of
measurable cardinals in  and max( ) is the only measurable cardinal  of
Mitchell order 2 (that is,  has a normal measure that concentrates on measurable
cardinals).
For each of these notions, there is a corresponding property of ordinals:  iff
 for some . For Notions 1-3, it might be possible to recover the
notion by using sequences of the appropriate type of ordinals in ; for Notion 4,
we would also need -reflective cardinals (or a sufficiently expressive
weakening) for recovery of the notion from . An interesting conjecture is that if
we weaken Notion 4 by using  in place of  for testing
correctness of , then the resulting  is such that  holds iff the theory of
 with parameters in  agrees with the theory of
 for every .
We can go beyond Notion 4 by including more measurable cardinals in , and we
conclude with one of the most expressive extensions to the language of set theory
that is currently known.
Notion 5: Define  to hold iff
(1) There is a transitive model  of ZFC such that domain( ) is the set of
measurable cardinals in , and for every  in the domain of ,  is the Mitchell
order of  in .  has only one cardinal  such that , and it is the
largest measurable cardinal in .
(2) For the class functions described above,  satisfies reflecting and large cardinal
properties so strong that the theory of  with parameters in 
is independent of .
[Note: We are not sure how to best handle parameters between min(domain( )) and
max(domain( )), but our handling probably does not diminish the expressive power
of the predicate.]
We can try to go further by making  an iterate of the minimal inner model with a
strong cardinal (and domain( ) the set of measurable cardinals in  below the
strong cardinal), but I am not sure that this notion is well-defined, so for now, we
ω
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will end our adventure here. As the expressiveness is increased, the notions
become more technical, and the question is: Is there a simpler and fundamentally
more expressive extension to the language of set theory?
8 Reflective Sequences
Note: This section was written as a standalone paper, but per reader's convenience
and request is also incorporated here. This section can be read independently of
the previous sections.
8.1 Introduction
Within the language of set theory, one reaches higher and higher expressive power
by climbing higher in the cumulative hierarchy of V. But how can we go further
once the language allows quantification over the whole V? Intuitively, we would
want to continue the hierarchy above V, except that all sets are already in V. The
solution is to label a cardinal κ such that Vκ is sufficiently close to V, and continue
the hierarchy above Vκ. Vκ represents V, and with κ labeled in an extended
language, hierarchy above Vκ corresponds to higher order set theory.
To go further, we can iterate higher order set theory by picking λ>κ with Vλ
representing V, and then μ>λ, and continuing to longer sequences of ordinals.
Thus, continuing the cumulative hierarchy above V corresponds to labeling certain
ordinals that are sufficiently similar to Ord — in other words, certain ordinals with
sufficiently strong reflection properties — while staying within V.
How do we choose the right κ? The answer is that we postulate a certain degree of
symmetry and reflection in V.
Convergence Hypothesis (general form): For an appropriate type of objects, all
objects of that type with sufficient reflection properties are, to a certain degree,
indistinguishable from each other.
Convergence Hypothesis (ordinals): If α and β are ordinals with sufficiently
strong reflection properties, then φ(S, α) ⇔ φ(S, β) whenever rank(S) < min(α, β)
and φ is a first order formula of set theory with two free variables.
Definition: κ is a reflective cardinal, denoted by R(κ), iff (V,∈,κ) has the same
theory with parameters in Vκ as (V,∈,λ) for every cardinal λ>κ with sufficiently
strong reflection properties.
Example: In L (assuming 0#), every Silver indiscernible has sufficient reflection
properties, which allows us to define RL in V.
Note: A formalist can treat the Convergence Hypothesis as a guiding principle to
get good systems of axioms. A formalist can ask, for example, whether we want the
Convergence Hypothesis to hold in V, and if yes (or maybe), investigate how far it
can hold and how to axiomatize it. A counterexample to the Convergence
Hypothesis would be a property that 'toggles', with an explanation of why it
toggles.
To the extent that it holds, the Convergence Hypothesis allows us to define new
reflective notions without ambiguity. We specify a notion by stating its type
(example: a pair of ordinals) along with the class of predicates for which it agrees
with all objects (of the same type) with sufficient reflection properties.
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Definition: Given a length condition P (such as having length ω), an increasing
sequence of ordinals S satisfying P is reflective (denoted by RP(S) or simply R(S)) iff
  (1) the theory of (V,∈,S) with parameters in Vmin(S) is correct, that is it agrees with
(V,∈,T) for every T satisfying P and having sufficient reflection properties and
min(T)>min(S), and
  (2) for every α<sup(S) S\α is reflective under the above criterion (where the
length condition is modified to correspond to S\α if S\α is "shorter" than S).
A variation on the notion is to omit the second condition.
Notes about R:
• We use R rather a single element of R for two reasons:
  - We want to be able to express predicates, such as the satisfaction relation of
(V,∈), and not just statements.
  - For infinite reflective sequences, it is unclear if (or how) an example is definable,
and we want the intended semantics of the language to be unambiguous.
• There is a hierarchy notions related to R based on the degree of "correctness"
required (one example is to allow just ΣV2 φ in the definition as opposed to Σ
V
<ω φ).
Essentially, our choice for R(x) is to require just enough correctness to maximize
expressiveness of (V,∈,x) for predicates that do not depend on x.
• In every extension here, R will correspond to a single type of objects (for
example, sequences of ordinals of length ω). However, these notions form a
hierarchy, and an alternative, which we will use informally, is to use R(x) in place of
Rtype(x)(x), thus having just a single symbol R.
8.2 Reflective Sequences
To understand the hierarchy of reflective sequences, imagine a process of picking
ordinals with sufficient reflection properties, and with the process itself having
sufficient reflection properties. Let S be a resulting sequence. Here are some
stages in the process:
1. n ordinals for finite n. This is well-understood (see Iterations of Reflectiveness
above for theory).
2. ω ordinals. See Reflective ω-Sequences above for some results. There is a
refined hierarchy based on the degree of correctness we require. We have good
axiomatization (specifically, through iterations of reflective cardinals) up to about
correctness in Lsup(S)(Vsup(S)), and through an analogue of Prikry forcing, we may
be able get up to M(Vsup(S)) (where M is a mouse operator and assuming sufficient
structure above M). However, under reasonable assumptions, full correctness in V
contradicts V=HOD, which makes analysis and finding of canonical models difficult.
A reasonable conjecture is that the Σ2 truth predicate of (Vsup(S), ∈, S) corresponds
to enumeration of all ordinal definable reals.
3. α ordinals for countable α. We expect R to be closed under subsequences that
preserve order type.
4. ω1 ordinals. Assuming the Continuum Hypothesis (CH), we cannot require
closure of R under all subsequences of the same length. Even without CH, this
limitation holds at ω2.
5. α ordinals for a fixed ordinal α >ω1 (min(S)>α).
6. More complicated conditions about the length of S, such as |S|=min(S). S
excludes its limit points.
7. Length of S has sufficiently strong reflection properties relative to S. S excludes
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its limit points.
8. To go beyond (7), we assume that S includes its limit points at places with
sufficient (relative to S) degree of reflectiveness. One may then state conditions on
the length of S such as "S includes exactly ω limit points, and they are cofinal in S"
or "S has maximum element and it is the only element such that S below it is
stationary".
9. Length of S has sufficiently strong reflection properties relative to S. This notion
is axiomatized in "Axiomatization of Long Reflective Sequences" below.
To go beyond what is expressible with S, we mark some points on S that have
sufficient (relative to S) degree of reflectiveness, analogously to how S is obtained
by marking some ordinals with sufficient reflectiveness in V. To go further, we then
add a third type of marking, and in general, for each ordinal in S, we can assign a
degree of reflectiveness through a function f:S→Ord\{∅}. For a limit α, f(x)=α
corresponds to x receiving all markings <α. In the definition of reflectiveness, use f
in place of S, min(dom(f)) in place of min(S) (and min(dom(T)) in place of min(T)),
sup(dom(f)) in place of sup(S), and in place of S\α, use f↾(Ord\α) modified to make
f(min(dom(f)\α)) equal 1. Here are some notions. (Here S=dom(f).)
10. For a fixed ordinal α, f(sup(S))=α (and hence sup(S)∈S), and sup(S) is the only
ordinal κ with f(κ)=α (and min(dom(f))>α).
11. f(sup(S))=sup(S), and sup(S) is the only ordinal κ with f(κ)=κ.
12. To go beyond f(κ)=κ, we modify the condition — that f(κ)=α+1 implies that κ
has sufficiently strong reflection properties relative to f that is clipped to α — by
invoking an ordinal notation system (for ordinals ≥κ) or just a comparison method
between f(λ) and f(κ), and considering f clipped below f(κ) as defined through the
comparison method. Below (in "Extension to Reflective Functions") we axiomatize
the following: There is only one ordinal κ with f(κ)=(κ+)HOD, and it equals
sup(dom(f)).
For reflective cardinals, an axiomatization essentially states the degree of
correctness (relative to other reflective cardinals) and existence of enough
reflective cardinals, and it can be extended with large cardinal axioms applied to
reflective cardinals. For reflective sequences, we also need to state enough axioms
for the sequence as a whole, or the axiomatization would be too incomplete. Just
like large cardinal axioms for cardinals, there are various axioms for reflective
sequences.
The type of f and many of its basic properties can be formalized using inner models.
For example, for notion 11 we can require that there is an inner model M of ZFC
such that
 - dom(f) is the set of measurable cardinals in M
 - for every κ in the domain of f, f(κ) is the Mitchell order of κ in M
 - M has only one cardinal κ such that o(κ)M=κ and it is the largest measurable
cardinal in M.
From inner model theory, it appears that without restricting the class of f that
satisfy the requirement, M can be taken to be an iterate of the minimal inner model
with these cardinals. The possibilities for M and iteration are sufficiently rich to get
any reasonable f corresponding to this notion (notion 11 in this case). One can also
similarly state requirements on M for other notions.
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If f satisfies the condition above (with M an iterate of the minimal model), then the
theory of (L(f),∈,f) is independent of f, which is one example of the Convergence
Hypothesis, and moreover, we can study this theory to get a better understanding
of f.
Our axiomatization involves a strengthening of the above condition by asserting
that elements of a reflective sequence are, in a sense, infinitary indiscernibles. To
do that, we need to know how much infinitary indiscernibility is possible in V.
8.3 Limits on Infinitary Indiscernibility
The axiom of choice sharply limits the amount of infinitary indiscernibility.
Theorem 18: For every uncountable sequence of distinct reals X, there is
X-definable f:V→ω such that for every S⊂Ord of order type ω1 there is X,S-definable
T⊂S of order type ω1 with f(T)≠f(S).
Notes:
• This implies that for every κ≥ω1, the partition relation κ → ω1
ω1ω fails for a
function f definable from X.
• For definability, ΔV2 definability more than suffices.
• If T could be made S-definable, the axioms below would be inconsistent, but a
weakening to (essentially) lightface version would be unaffected.
• Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Hugh Woodin for outlining a proof of a
weaker version of the theorem with exponent ω2.
Proof:
Using X, we can define a sequence X′ of subsets of ω of length ω1 that does not
have a perfect subset. Thus, the following game (this is the standard game for the
perfect subset property) is undetermined:
Player I: Each move consists of zero or more zeroes and ones.
Player II: Each move is 0 or 1.
Player I wins iff if the concatenation of the moves belongs to the set (X′).
However, analogously to the standard proof of analytic determinacy from sharps
(which can be found in, for example, Wikipedia Determinacy article (accessed
October 30, 2016)), the partition relation would make the game determined as
follows. The tree TX′ corresponding to the game will have ω1 branches at the root,
each corresponding to an element of X′, and no further branches. The open
auxiliary game requires player II to play the subtree of TX′ corresponding to the
play so far (including all initial segments of the play), and a mapping of the subtree
into ordinals, such that the mappings are consistent with each other and agree with
the Kleene-Brouwer order. Player I wins the auxiliary game and has a definable
strategy: For example, pick the least move that gives maximum reduction of the
rank of the remaining game. Let g(S) return move given position where S is the set
of ordinals used in the tree. If we attempt to use S to convert the strategy into a
strategy for the original game, the failure will give us the required T. While g
returns elements of 2ω, it can be converted into f:V→ω as follows: f(S)=2n+(g(S))n
where n = min(m: ∃T⊂S T∈Def(X′,S) ∧ |T|=ω1 ∧ (g(S))m≠(g(T))m)) where Def(X′,S)
can be for example definability from X′,S in Vsup(S)+1.
Corollary 19: There is a definable predicate P such that for every set of ordinals S
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of order type at least (22
ω1)+ there are subsets T1 and T2 of order type ω1*2 such
that such that P(T1)≠P(T2).
Proof Sketch: Here is one such P: P(S) iff {Si:i<ω1} agrees with {Si:ω1≤i<ω1*2}
with respect to all predicates that are definable in Vsup(S) using parameters that are
subsets of ω1.
In the absence of a convincing theory, lack of closure under subsets would cast
doubt on whether the notions of reflective sequences are well-defined. However, we
can weaken closure under subsets by requiring the subsets to be definable, and
that may give us what we need to axiomatize R.
Note: It is also possible that the convergence hypothesis holds for statements but
not for statements with arbitrary sets as parameters. In that case, R would be
ill-defined in V but might have a preferred well-defined theory, and its lightface
version (requiring correctness only for statements without parameters) would be
well defined. If the 'boldface' version is ill-defined or otherwise undesirable, the
systems of axioms below can be modified for the lightface version by requiring the
relevant theories to agree without parameters (as opposed to with parameters), and
analogously for a strengthening of the lightface version that allows countable
sequences of ordinals as parameters.
On the other hand, assuming determinacy of games on ordinals of length ω1 and
ordinal definable payoff, κ → κω12λ holds for every regular countably closed κ and
λ<κ for functions definable from a countable sequence of ordinals. See Local
Versions of Reflectiveness above for a proof sketch of a more general proposition
using Extended Determinacy Maximum. Question: Can similar relations can be
obtained from much weaker assumptions?
Partition relations with exponents >ω1 might be consistent by restricting to
definable subsets. A strengthening of the strong partition relation (restricted to
definable partitions and subsets) is to also require the homogeneous set to have
enough limit points and require the same of the subset, and this can be
strengthened further by requiring the sets to be in an appropriate filter. Here is a
key proposition to investigate:
Conjecture: There is an ordinal κ, a normal nonprincipal κ-complete ultrafilter U
on κ, and S∈U such that for every T⊂S with T∈U and T ordinal definable from S
and a countable set of ordinals, (V, ∈, T) and (V, ∈, S) have the same ΣV2 theory with
parameters in Vmin(S).
Question: Is this conjecture consistent?
If consistent and nonrestrictive, this property can be used in axiomatization of long
reflective sequences of ordinals as follows.
8.4 Axiomatization of Long Reflective Sequences
Here is an axiomatization corresponding to notion 9 above. Its consistency and
truthfulness are unclear.
Language: ∈, R (unary predicate)
Definition: Theory(M, ∈, S; W) (where M is transitive, S⊂M and W⊂M) is {"φ",w:
w∈W ∧ (M,∈,S)⊨φ(w)} where φ has 1 free variable and may use relational symbols
'∈' and 'S' (unary predicate).
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Definition: ODS(C) is the class of sets ordinal definable (without using R) from S
and elements of C.
Definition: R1(κ) ⇔ ∃S∈R κ∈S
Note: sup stands for supremum.
Axioms:
1. ZFC
2. ∀x∃y∀z(z∈y⇔z∈x∧R(z))
3. R(S) ⇔ Raux(S) ∧ ∀α<sup(S) Raux(S\α)
    where Raux(S) ⇔ S≠∅ ∧ S⊂Ord ∧ ∀T∈R ∀κ∈R1\(sup(S∪T)+1) Theory(Vκ, ∈, S;
Vmin(S∪T)) = Theory(Vκ, ∈, T; Vmin(S∪T))
4. (schema; n is a natural number) ∃κ∈R1 ∃S∈R κ=sup(S) ∧ Vκ ≺ΣRn V
5. ∃S∈R ∃U∋S (a normal nonprincipal κ-complete ultrafilter on κ=sup(S))
∀T∈ODS(Ord
ω) (T⊂S ∧ T∈U ⇒ R(T)).
Notes:
(3) specifies the type of R and the degree of correctness required. The intended
semantics is that members of R have sufficiently strong reflection properties so
as to (if possible) render R unambiguous in V. As mentioned above, the general
underlying hypothesis is that for an appropriate type, all objects of that type with
sufficiently strong reflection properties are sufficiently indistinguishable from
each other.
Raux and R have the same expressive power (the definition of Raux in (3) could
just as well have used Raux; R1 is {min(S):S∈Raux}), but R is more natural (and is
different from Raux). Other than that, (1)-(4) are essentially standard, and the
combinatorial properties are obtained from (5).
(4) is a strengthening of replacement for formulas with R, and it also ensures
that sup(S) has essentially the same properties as members of S.
A weakening of (5) (if one objects to requiring measurable cardinals in V) is to
require U to be an ultrafilter on a smaller model ZFC, as long as it contains
HOD(Vκ, S).
It is unclear whether the property in (5) holds for all members of R. Its
weakening to ΣVn predicates holds, but it is unclear whether U can be chosen
independent of n.
In (5), it is unclear whether the ultrafilter itself can be chosen to have a
canonical theory with parameters in Vκ.
A strengthening of 5 is to also require S∈iU(R) to hold (where iU is the
embedding corresponding to U).
These notes also apply to the extension to reflective functions below (except the
part about S∈iU(R)).
Using the theorem above, the axioms imply that there is no OD(Ordω) uncountable
sequence of distinct reals.
Question: Is it consistent/provable/true that ∃κ>0 ∀f:κ→κ ∃T∈R∩P(κ) ∀α<κ
Tα+1>f(Tα)?
If yes, what about the stronger ∀S∈U ∃T⊂S T∈R∩U (where U is as in axiom 5
above)?
Notes:
* The same question can be asked about extensions to reflective functions using the
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domain of the function in place of T.
* The statement (either weaker or stronger form) is natural and appears to fill in
the gap created by the lack of closure of R under subsequences. However, we do
not know whether there are 'pathological' counterexamples to the statement.
* If true but unprovable, the statement is a good addition to the axioms.
Here are possible outcomes for the axioms:
a. The axioms are inconsistent. One would then search for a suitable replacement,
and if it is found, try again.
b. The axioms are consistent but restrictive (for example, they contradict a true
large cardinal axiom). One would then also look for replacement (though models for
the axioms may also be interesting).
c. The axioms are consistent but too incomplete because the underlying notion is
ill-defined. One can still study models with the axioms, and appreciate the
underlying symmetry and beauty.
d. The axioms are consistent but too incomplete. One would then search for
additional axioms. Good axiomatization is key evidence that the underlying notion
is well-defined.
e. The axioms form the core of the theory, but it can still be extended, analogously
to ZFC forming basic axioms for set theory.
8.5 Extension to Reflective Functions
We can go beyond notion 9 by having a coherent system of measures instead of a
single measure. For an ordinal κ, measure U(κ,α) (note that its Mitchell rank need
not be α) will witness that there are enough ordinals λ<κ with f(λ)=α (or if α≥κ
that f(λ) corresponds to α). For transformations of f, besides reducing its domain,
we can downgrade some of the labels. A complication is that in the transformed f,
we may have, for example, an ordinal with label 2 without enough label 1 ordinals
below it. We resolve it by recursively relabeling ordinals, each time keeping as
much structure as is compatible with the labels for lower ordinals. The proposed
axiomatization for notion 12 is as follows.
Language: ∈, R (unary predicate)
Definition: κ∈R1 ⇔ ∃f∈R "f is a nonempty function with dom(f)⊂Ord" ∧
κ=min(dom(f)).
Note: See above for definitions of Theory(M, ∈, S; W) and OD.
Axioms:
1. ZFC
2. ∀x∃y∀z(z∈y⇔z∈x∧R(z))
3. R(f) ⇔ Raux(f) ∧ ∀α<sup(dom(f)) ∃β>α Raux(f↾(Ord\β))
    where Raux(f) ⇔ f≠∅ ∧ (f is a function) ∧ dom(f)⊂Ord ∧ ran(f)⊂Ord ∧ ∀g∈R
∀κ∈R1\(sup(dom(f)∪dom(g))+1) Theory(Vκ, ∈, f; Vmin(dom(f)∪dom(g))) = Theory(Vκ,
∈, g; Vmin(dom(f)∪dom(g))).
4. (length condition) ∀f∈R {κ∈dom(f): f(κ)=(κ+)HOD} = {sup(dom(f))}
5. (schema; n is a natural number) ∃κ∈R1 ∃f∈R κ=sup(dom(f)) ∧ Vκ ≺ΣRn V
6. (key combinatorial principle) There is f ∈ R and a sequence of ultrafilters U such
that:
     i. dom(U) = {(κ,α): κ∈dom(f) ∧ α<f(κ)}
    ii. U(κ,α) is a κ-complete normal nonprincipal ultrafilter on κ
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   iii. ∀(κ,α)∈dom(U) (κ,α)∉dom(iU(κ,α)(U)) ∧ ∀β<α iU(κ,α)(U)(κ,β) = U(κ,β)
(coherence condition; i is the embedding corresponding to the ultrafilter)
   iv. Given a function g:Ord→Ord\{∅} with dom(g)⊂dom(f), define g′ (with dom(g′
)=dom(g)) as follows: g′(κ)=min(g(κ), sup(α+1: α=0 ∨ ∃β>0 iU(κ,β)(g′)(κ) = α)).  Key
Condition: ∀g∈ODf(Ord
ω) g′(sup(dom(f))) = f(sup(dom(f))) ⇒ R(g′).
8.6 Further Extensions
General
To extend the language further, some of the possibilities are:
Extend the length condition to a higher ordinal.1. 
Extend R to a different type of objects.2. 
Find a different property in the set-theoretical universe.3. 
Find something other than sets that is not reducible to sets.4. 
The axioms above are essentially independent of the length condition, and by using
(non-overlapping) extenders in place of ultrafilters, we can go up to a strong
cardinal (though the resulting system might well be inconsistent or otherwise
false). On the other hand, our semantic development depends on being able to
compare f(κ) with f(λ). We can likely go beyond (κ+)HOD by, for example, using R to
define a higher ordinal and requiring correctness relative to R in the axioms to
define R'. To potentially go much further, note that we depend only on the
correctness of theory with appropriate parameters rather being able to compare all
f(κ) and f(λ), and it is possible that there is unique privileged theory here.
Question: Does the convergence hypothesis apply to the class of iterates of the
minimal inner model with a strong cardinal?
If yes, then we have a corresponding extension to the language of set theory,
essentially corresponding to maximal canonical non-overlapping f.
Overlapping Extenders
We can try to go even further by allowing f to overlap, that is by letting f(κ)≥λ for
λ>κ and λ∈dom(f). This may be analogous to overlapping extenders in the models
beyond a strong cardinal — for example two cardinals strong up to the same
measurable cardinal may correspond with f(κ) = f(λ) = min(dom(f)\(λ+1)) (with
κ<λ) — but there are other possibilities as well, and the right framework is unclear.
For overlapping f, we must impose a restriction on the type of overlap. Otherwise,
let x0<x1<x2<... be an infinite sequence of ordinals such that ∀i<ω f(xi) ≥
sup(xi:i<ω). Let yi=min(α: f(α)≥xi). Without restrictions on overlapping, we would
have y0<y1<...<x0, and repeating the process with y in place of x, we get
z0<z1<...y0, and so on, leading to infinite regress. One restriction is to prohibit
infinite overlap — that is to prohibit x0<x1<... with ∀i<ω f(xi)≥xi+1. However, this
restriction is too limiting, and there is a better alternative. Note that if κ < λ < μ
and κ is <λ-strong and λ is <μ strong, then κ is <μ strong. Analogously, we require
that ∀κ∈dom(f)∀λ∈dom(f) (κ<λ ∧ f(κ)≥λ ⇒ f(κ)≥f(λ)).
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The right general framework is to have a rich system of embeddings to witness f,
perhaps using iteration trees. For an example, suppose f(κ)=λ+1 where
λ=min(dom(f)\(κ+1)) and μ>λ and μ∈dom(f). If we remove all ordinals strictly
between κ and μ from dom(f), then we should be able to arrange f(κ)=μ+1, and the
system should have an embedding to witness that. However, we do not yet know
how to axiomatize such systems. Below, we attempt an axiomatization for limited
degree of overlap and without the ability to move f(κ) upward. The later restriction
might make the system too incomplete, but (if consistent) it should still show
important structure.
Language: ∈, R (unary predicate)
Note: See "Axiomatization of Long Reflective Sequences" above for definitions of
Theory(M, ∈, S; W) and OD.
Axioms:
1,2,3 as above ("Extension to Reflective Functions").
4. (schema; n is a natural number) There is f ∈ R, κmax=sup(dom(f)), a sequence of
extenders E, and an ultrafilter U such that:
     i. dom(E) = {(κ,α): κ∈dom(f) ∧ α<f(κ)}
    ii. E(κ,α) is a normal short extender such that the corresponding embedding
iE(κ,α) is α-dom(E)-S strong and has critical point κ. Here S is the satisfaction
relation for ΣR,Vn formulas.
   iii. ∀(κ,α)∈dom(E) (κ,α)∉dom(iE(κ,α)(E)) ∧ ∀β<α iE(κ,α)(E)(κ,β) = E(κ,β) (coherence
condition)
   iv. U is a κmax-complete normal nonprincipal ultrafilter on κmax.
    v. Vκmax ≺ΣRn V and Theory(V,∈,R,f;Vκmax) = Theory(i
U(V),∈,iU(R),f;Vκmax), where
Theory is restricted to φ with n unbounded quantifiers.
   vi. Given a function g:κmax→Ord, define g′:κmax→Ord as follows: g′(κ) = min({g(κ),
sup(α+1: ∃β iE(κ,β)(g′)(κ) = α)} ∪ {sup(α+1: α<g′(λ) ∧ ∀γ<g′(λ)∃β iE(λ,β)(g′)(λ)≥γ ∧
iE(λ,β)(g′)(κ)≥α): λ<κ ∧ g′(λ)≥κ}}.  Let g′′ = g′↾{κ:g′(κ)>0}.  Key Condition:
∀g∈ODf,R(Ord
ω) ({λ∈dom(g′′): g′′(λ)=κmax}∈U ⇒ Theory(V,∈,R,g′′;Vκmax) =
Theory(V,∈,R,f;Vκmax)), where Theory is restricted to φ with n unbounded
quantifiers. Furthermore, if g↾dom(f) = f, then g′′ is f.
Notes:
If the system is inconsistent, it may still be useful as an outline of how the axioms
can look like.
A schema was used to get the most natural stopping point at the price of some
syntactic complexity. However, expressiveness using R goes only slightly beyond
what is expressible with a single f∈R (assuming the relevant objects are in
Vmin(dom(f))), and there is a natural mild weakening of 4 that avoids the schema
and goes just beyond what is expressible about f without using R:
  4.ii - let S be the satisfaction relation for (V,∈,f) formulas (which is definable
using R and f). It is unclear whether omitting S entirely would cause much harm.
  4.v - simply require that iU(R)(f) holds, and as a partial substitute for the
remainder, add axiom 5 (from "Extension to Reflective Functions") to the axioms
(or a related statement/schema).
  4.vi - instead of using Theory, just require that g′′∈R; also, prohibit use of R in
defining g.
α-dom(E) strongness ensures that the embeddings witness not only the absolute
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largeness of f(κ) but also the structure of f between κ and f(κ).
In 4.vi, note that if κ∉dom(f), then there is no E(κ,β), and sup(∅)=∅.
In 4.vi, "g′′ is f" is used to avoid having to write out some properties twice (once
for f and once for g′′).
The difference of 4.vi from Extension to Reflective Functions 6.v is the treatment
of overlapping f. If f(λ)>λ, then the structure of f between λ and f(λ) must be
witnessed using E(λ,α) and hence by f below λ, and we apply the same
requirement to g′. Thus, if the necessary structure below λ is erased, we
correspondingly reduce g′ in the region between λ and f(λ).
For a model M with overlapping extenders, there may be multiple reasonable ways
to represent M by f, and there is additional structure and complexity once M has a
cardinal κ with a measure that concentrates on <κ-strong cardinals. One option is
to let R apply to models directly (and for now, dropping the analogue of the second
condition in the definition of R). Here is an example: R = {code(M): M0
elementarily embeds into M and (V,∈,code(M)) has the correct theory with
parameters in Vκ where κ is the least measurable cardinal in M}, where M0 is (for
example) the minimal inner model with a measurable limit λ of <λ-S-strong
cardinals where S is the set of <λ strong cardinals, and code(M)=Vδ
M for the least
δ such that M=L(Vδ
M).
The study of reflective constructs has only just begun.
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